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Not Altogether Clear
reviewing the decision of the United same character and the same value, adds
States Supreme Court, under date of nothing to the company's resources, but
January 6, 1930, in the case of United Rail- merely keeps them at the same level."
ways and Electric Company of Baltimore
The argument of counsel for the Commisv. West, Chairman, et al (Public Service sion is one of the best reasons yet advanced
Commission of Maryland), one cannot help for replacement costs. If it is granted that
but be somewhat amused at an admission the amount invested in five units of propof uncertainty expressed in the decision of erty on the basis of original cost will purthe Maryland Court of Appeals, from chase but four units when the time to
which decision the case went up, on ap- replace arrives, and the utility will at that
peal, to the United States Supreme Court. time still require five units for efficient
The admission is found in the following service, let the corporation then borrow,
quotation:
or increase its own capital investment
"Counsel for the commission suggests accordingly. There can be no objection
that to restore value would be to 'require during the next depreciation cycle, under
the financing of additions to plant, to the the original cost theory, which then will be
extent of the excess of replacement over applicable, to recovering the additional
original cost of property replaced, by the amount invested from recipients of service
public, which would in turn have to pay in that cycle. Ergo, why not extract, in
a return on the capital thus required.' The advance, from the present generation,
what it is estimated will be required
meaning of that suggestion is not altogether
clear, but if it is that the company is en- sometime in the future?
titled to the return of anything less than
The decision of the Supreme Court of the
the value of its property it cannot be sus- United States is interesting, but long. The
tained. Money deducted from earnings to essence of the decision, from an accounting
replace equipment which has become worn point of view, is found in the following:
out or obsolete, by other equipment of the
"In determining adequate rates for a
IN
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public utility, the allowances for annual
depreciation must be based, not upon cost,
but upon present value."
The dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis, supported by Justices Holmes and
Stone, is a classic. Probably never before
has such an imposing array of authority
been marshalled in support of an accounting question. While it is unfortunate that
lack of space here makes it necessary to
extract the pith of the argument, it appears
to be expressed in the following excerpts:
"The business men's practice of using a
depreciation charge based on the original
cost of the plant in determining the profits
or losses of a particular year has abundant

April

official sanction and encouragement." . . .
"Business men realized fully that the
requirements for replacement might be
more or less than the original cost. But
they realized also that to attempt to make
the depreciation account reflect economic
conditions and changes would entail entry
upon new fields of conjecture and prophecy
which would defeat its purposes." . . .
"To use a depreciation charge as the
measure of the year's consumption of plant,
and at the same time reject original cost as
the basis of the charge, is inadmissible."
(Knaebel, Official Reports of the Supreme
Court, Vol. 280 U . S., Number 4, Page
234-291.)

Comment
E decision of the United States SuTHpreme
Court, to which reference has

been made above, leaves no doubt as to
the opinion of a majority of the members
of that tribunal concerning the preferable
basis for public utility depreciation. It is
practically the first utterance in which the
decision has been conclusive in this respect.
The O'Fallon decision, which has been
repeatedly cited in support of the present
value theory, apparently may be so interpreted only by inference. The Interstate
Commerce Commission was reversed by the
Courts because it was adjudged to be in
error for failing to recognize present value.
Section 15A, paragraph 4, of the Transportation Act of 1920, directs that in determining values of railway property for
purposes of recapture the commission shall
"give due consideration to all the elements
of value recognized by the law of the land
for rate-making purposes * * * ".
On this point, in the O'Fallon case, the
United States Supreme Court said: "In
the exercise of its proper function this
court has declared the law of the land concerning valuations for rate-making purposes. The commission disregarded the
approved rule and has thereby failed to
discharge the definite duty imposed by
Congress. * * * Whether the commission

acted as directed by Congress was the
fundamental question presented."
In the O'Fallon case the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis is, as usual,
illuminating: " * * * In 1920, no fact was
more prominent in the mind of the public
and of Congress than that the cost of living
was far greater than that prevailing when
the existing railroads were built. * * * If
it had been the intention of Congress to
compel the commission to increase values
for rate-making purposes because the price
level had risen, it would naturally have
incorporated such a direction in the paragraph. * * *
"The insertion in Section 15A of the provision that the commission 'shall give to
the property investment account of the
carriers only that consideration which under the law it is entitled to in establishing
values for rate-making purposes,' and the
rejection of other proposed measures of
value show that Congress intended not to
impose restrictions upon the discretion of
the commission."
We do not understand the O'Fallon decision to prescribe present value as the
basis for depreciation. There can be no
doubt concerning the intention of the Baltimore case so to do. Whether correct or
not the latter decision is clear.
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